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I. INSURABLE INTEREST
In Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Brown,' the named insured in a fire policy
was Walter Brown. Walter had at one time owned the property
insured. He had, however, conveyed it to his divorced wife Elsie,
for whom he "was looking after the property," prior to the taking
out of this policy. It was not alleged that the defendant's agent (who
had previously written other policies on the property in Walter's name
at the time Walter was the title-holder) knew of the conveyance to
Elsie. After total destruction by fire the defendant refused to pay on
the grounds of the lack of insurable interest. The Court of Appeals
for the Eastern Section affirmed a judgment against the company. In
its opinion, the court reviewed at some length the Tennessee cases
indicating that the insurable interest requirement does not demand
legal title in the insured. The court concluded:
Under the proof in this case, Walter Brown acted as the agent of the owner
in looking after the property and keeping it insured. If he had failed to
procure insurance he might have been held responsible for the loss and we
think, under the authorities above cited and discussed, he had an insurable
interest.
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty Adviser, Vanderbilt Law
Review.
1. 381 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1964).
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The decision is unusually liberal in interpreting the insurable interest
requirement.2 It may be viewed as an extension of the rule adopted
from a legal encyclopedia in Baird v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co.:
3
"One having the care, custody, or possession of property for another
(or others) without liability and without any pecuniary interest
therein may nevertheless obtain insurance thereon for the benefit of
the owner." However, it is not necessary to go so far, for the
court's emphasis on the potential liability of the named insured as
custodian demonstrates a relationship between him and the res insured
which supports the policy.4
II. SELECION AND CONROL OF RISKS
A. Scope of Coverage
The policy issued by the insurer in American Employers Ins. Co. v.
Knox-Tenn Equipment Co.5 provided for indemnity to the insured
for liability to pay "damages because of injury to or destruction of
property... caused by accident." The insured sold a customer drill
bits which were allegedly too large for the job the customer had
undertaken; as a result of using the oversize bits, a hardwood floor laid
by the insured's customer buckled and had to be relaid. After agreeing
to relay the floor, the insured's customer filed suit against the insured.
The insured asked the insurer to defend the action; the insurer refused
and brought this declaratory judgment action. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's decision in favor of the insurer. The court
traced at some length the shades of meaning attributed to the term
"accident" in the Tennessee cases, ending by noting that "the trend of
modern decisions is to treat the terms 'accidental means, accident,
accidental result, accidental injury, accidental death and the like as
being legally synonymous."" The opinion makes it clear that the fact
that the insured's customer intended to use the particular drill bits he
used, and that the insured intended to sell those bits did not preclude
the existence of an accident. The court drew analogies to cases in
which accidental death benefits were allowed to persons who in-
tentionally consumed food or drugs whose poisonous effect they did
not anticipate.6
2. See generally 4 APPLEmw, INSURANCE LA-w AND PRAcIE §§ 2149 (husband-
wife), 2212 (principal-agent), 2211 (custodian) (1941).
3. 178 Tenn. 653, 670, 162 S.W.2d 384, (W.S. 1942).
4. The problem remains of determining the extent to which one caring for property
has insured solely his own interest, or has taken out the policy on his interest and also
for the benefit of the owner. See 3 CoUcH, INSURANCE §§ 24:21, 24:22 (2d ed. 1960).
5. 377 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1964).
6. The court employed many analogies from contracts of personal insurance, since
cases dealing with products liability policies are relatively infrequent.
1238 [ VOL. 18
INSURANCE
The policy in Kernodle v. Peerless Life Ins. Co. 7 provided a 5,000
dollar accidental death benefit for death arising from injuries "received
while the insured is riding as a fare-paying passenger within the
enclosed part of any railway passenger car. . . ." The cestui que vie
boarded a train at Little Rock, Arkansas as a coach passenger, and
then transferred to a pullman car. Shortly thereafter, the conductor
noted that one of the doors in the vestibule to the pullman car was
open and that the cestui que vie was missing from his compartment;
his body was later found beside the tracks. The insurer sought to
defend on two grounds: first that the cestui que vie had intentionally
taken his own life; second, that his injuries were not received while
within the enclosed part of the railway car. The trial court found
against the insurer on both points, and the supreme court affirmed.
The suicide issue is dealt with elsewhere.8 With regard to the language
of the policy dealing with the "enclosed part of the railway car," the
court held that recovery could properly be based on a finding that the
cestui que vie's riding within the enclosed part of the railway car
(the vestibule) was the proximate cause of his death. Since the evi-
dence below would support such an interpretation of the events that
took place, the award was affirmed.
The policy involved in Hattley v. Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co.9
provided in part for protection from "injury to or destruction of
property in charge of the insured arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance or use of any hoist for raising the entire automobile for the
lubricating or servicing thereof . . . ." The insured, operator of a
service station in Memphis, raised the vehicle in question on his hoist
in order more easily to repair the vehicle's gas tank. Preparatory to
making the repairs, it was necessary to drain the tank. While draining
it, a quantity of gasoline spilled out, and its fumes ignited. The
vehicle on the hoist was damaged in the ensuing fire, and the insured
sought recovery for this damage. The company refused on the ground
that the damage did not "arise out of" the use of the hoist since there
was no causal connection between use of the hoist and the fire. The
trial court found for the defendant, but the court of appeals reversed.
The court stated: "we think the absence of causal connection is
immaterial . " The court supported its conclusion by reliance on
the decision in Ludlow v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., in which it was
held that an insurer need not demonstrate causal connection between
intoxication and death in order to defend under a suspension clause
providing the policy would not cover loss or injury "sustained by the
7. 378 S.W.2d 744 (Tenn. 1964).
8. Patterson, Evidence-1964 Tennessee Survey, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1221 (1965).
9. 383 S.W.2d 764 (Tenn. App. S.W. 1964).
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insured while he has physically present in his body intoxicating
liquors . . . ." It is respectfully submitted that the term "while"
would carry to the ordinary mind a different connotation from the
phrase "arising out of." This latter phrase has been accepted as
requiring some sort of causal connection both in workmen's compen-
sation cases,10 and in the interpretation of insurance contracts." It
would seem obvious that in order to justify recovery under this policy,
the insured should be required to show some connection between the
use of the hoist and the injury received; otherwise the language would
be totally disregarded. If the connection that need be shown is not
causal, then what is it? One would hope that in saying the absence
of causal connection is immaterial under this wording, the court was
simply referring to the absence of that particular type of causal
connection between the use of the hoist and the injury which would
be required in a tort action for negligence. Certainly, there is no
reason to import into the law of insurance the technical niceties of
proximate cause. But it does not seem unjust to require of an insured
that he demonstrate some rational connection between use of the hoist
and injury to property. Not to require this would seem to abandon
the definition of the insured event entirely.
Two cases published during the survey period involve the concept
of implied permission, applied to extend coverage to an additional
insured, under the standard automobile policy. The familiar language
involved is that defining the term "insured" to include "any person
while using the automobile and any person or organization responsible
for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the
named insured or such spouse or with the permission of either." In
Pollard v. Safeco Ins. Co.,'2 the automobile was purchased by Miss
Judy Towle, a minor, but was registered in the name of her mother,
Mrs. Hamilton. One day Miss Towle, whom the policy listed as driver
after naming Mrs. Hamilton as owner (and therefore named insured),
had a fiat tire. She asked the owner at her parking garage to have
it fixed. The garage had no facilities for repairing the puncture, so
the owner drove the car to a tire repair shop. En route, he struck and
injured a third party. The court was asked to hold the garage owner
to be an additional insured under the policy. The court did so,
stating: "She [the named insured] must have known that somewhere,
sometime in the course of that general use it would become necessary
for her daughter to have the car repaired and as an incident thereto
it would normally be temporarily delivered into the possession of the
repairman and very likely operated for short distances by such repair-
10. 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6.00 (1952).
11. Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 150, 154 (1963).
12. 376 S.W.2d 730 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
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man." The court distinguished two previous cases: American Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. v. Jones,13 on the ground that in that case the named
insured had expressly forbidden the original permittee to allow
another to drive; and Card v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co.,14 on
the ground that the use to which the car was put by the second
permittee was not in any way for the benefit of the original permittee.
In Teague v. Tate,15 the named insured gave his son (Teague)
permission to drive the insured car to a social event near Jackson.
During the evening, young Teague became sleepy and asked another
teen-ager in the car with him (Tate) to take the wheel. Tate did
so, and while driving had an accident. The injured third party
recovered in federal district court against Tate and both Teagues.
The insurer paid the judgment, and then brought this action against
Tate to recover from him and his parents (and their liability insurer)
the amount paid out. The trial court entered judgment for the insurer;
the defendants appealed; the court of appeals reversed; in this opinion
the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the action of the court of
appeals. The named insured testified that he had never forbidden
his son to allow his companions to drive the family car, and that he
assumed that from time to time they "swapped up driving." The
supreme court noted: "We think all of us, including the insurance
companies, may assume with Mr. Tate, that boys seventeen or eighteen
years of age out in an automobile with their girl friends will 'swap
up' on the driving occasionally." As a result, the court found that
Tate had implied permission to make use of the automobile, and thus
was an additional insured.
Both decisions seem sensible. Both reflect the practicalities of
modem use of automobiles by minors. Indeed, one would have been
surprised had the daughter phoned home in the first case to ask her
mother if she might have the tire repaired; to all intents and purposes
it was the daughter's responsibility to see to it the car was properly
cared for. One would be almost astounded if the teen-age boy in the
second case had phoned his father in the middle of the night to ask
him if young Tate could bring the car home. Moreover, it is
significant that in this case Teague's father had been found liable
under the family purpose doctrine without reference to the insurance
problem. While it is certainly true that not all the niceties of
respondeat superior and its variants may properly be read into the
definition of additional insured, it is reasonable to extend the coverage
of the policy as far along those lines as its language will reasonably
permit. Otherwise, the named insured will be subject to potential
13. 163 Tenn. 605, 45 S.W.2d 52 (1932).
14. 20 Tenn. App. 132, 95 S.W.2d 1281 (M.S. 1936).
15. 375 S.W.2d 840 (Tenn. 1964).
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liabilities arising out of the ownership, maintenance and use of his
vehicle from which he is in practice unable to protect himself.
16
In two cases published during the period it was held that the United
States may be an "additional insured" of its employees' automobile
liability policies in spite of the 1961 amendments to the Federal Tort
Claims Act.17 One of these cases represented a change in rule by a
federal district judge.' 8 The writer still considers the result unfortu-
nate, as was stated in last year's Survey, although justifiable under the
broad language of the typical omnibus clause.19
In Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,20 it was held that
an insurer may be held liable for punitive damages assessed against
the named insured in one of its liability policies. The supreme court
discussed at length the recent decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Northwestern National Cas. Co. v. McNulty,2 ' which
reached the contrary result. The Lazenby opinion offered three
principal bases for differing with McNulty: First, the court expressed
skepticism with regard to the deterrent effect that would be achieved
by requiring the insured to pay his own punitive damages. Second,
the court indicated it felt the average insured would expect to be
covered for punitive damages. Third, the court was concerned about
the "fine line between simple negligence and negligence upon which
an award for punitive damages can be made." This last point was
developed in greater detail in Justice White's concurring opinion. In
that opinion, Justice White traces the development of liability insur-
ance and notes that at one time it was argued such insurance was
itself violative of public policy for it permitted a man to insure
against his own carelessness. Allowing this, it was then said, would
encourage recklessness and wanton negligence. Should this argument,
rejected as to basic liability coverage, prevail as to punitive damages?
No, Justice White suggests, because one cannot probe the minds
of juries to determine what persuaded them to reach their verdict.
The decision in the instant case is difficult to reconcile with the
underlying theory of permitting punitive damage awards. If the intent
of allowing such awards is to punish the offender, then this intent is
16. Similar decisions have been reached in other states. See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Marshbank, 128 F. Supp. 943 (D. Pa.), aff'd, 226 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1955).
17. McCrary v. United States v. State Farm Auto. Liab. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 33
(E.D. Tenn. 1964); Patterson v. United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233
F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
18. In the McCrary opinion, Judge Neese acquiesced in this rule for the sake of
uniformity in spite of his personal preference as expressed in Gipson v. Shelly, 219
F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
19. Covington, Insurance-1963 Tennessee Survey, 17 VAN'. L. REv. 1075, 1077-79
(1964).
20. 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964).
21. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962), 16 V.AND. L. REv. 435 (1963).
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in large part thwarted by transferring this liability to a third party.
If, as the court seems to suspect (although the point is not directly
made), punitive damage. awards are at times partly compensatory,
then one is led to suggest that the trouble lies with the punitive
damages doctrine, not with insurance. On the other hand, the rule
adopted by the Lazenby opinion does have the salutary effect of
reducing potential conflicts of interest between insurer and insured,
it does offer a better prospect of full recovery by the injured third
party, and it probably reflects the interpretation put on their policies
by most insureds. Moreover, as the concurring opinion notes, it would
be quite simple for the standard policy form to resolve the problem
by new wording.
B. Exclusions
The two exclusion decisions handed down during the year were
not unexpected. In Dressler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co.,22 the issue was whether the injured party was a "member of
the family of the insured residing in the same household as the
insured" under an automobile policy. The injured party was the
named insured's mother. Named insured was a doctor who had
recently completed his internship at Memphis, and who was occupying
the first floor of his parents' home at the time of the accident. It
was shown that the doctor, his wife, and the parents spent much
time together; that they ate together, and so on. The court held that
under these facts it was proper for the lower court to find the exclu-
sion applied.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co.23 was a decision
by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirming a decision discussed
in last year's Survey. With all respect, the passage of time has done
nothing to change the writer's conclusion that the employee exclusion
has been misapplied.
C. Exceptions
Horace Mann Mutual Ins. Co. v. Burrow,24 called for interpretation
of the "pre-existing sickness" exception in a health and accident
policy. The particular clause provided the policy did not cover "any
loss resulting from sickness contracted or commencing prior to the
time a person is insured under this policy. . . ." Insured became
covered under the policy on April 12, 1959. On October 26, 1959, he
"developed an internal physical difficulty, which was determined to
be a congenital esophageal bronchial fistula, requiring surgery ....
22. 376 S.W.2d 700 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
23. 330 F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1964).
24. 373 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. 1963).
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The insurer declined to pay the resulting medical expenses on the
ground of the clause just quoted. In the trial court, the insured was
awarded a judgment for these expenses. The supreme court affirmed,
holding that the inception of sickness should be dated from the time of
its manife/tation. Prior to October 26, the insured had led a full active
life, in no way conscious of his congenital defect. He had at one time
served in the military and had passed the physical examination for
service. This holding is in accord with the overwhelming majority of
decisions in this country.25 It should be considered in conjunction with
an earlier decision of the court of appeals placing the burden of proof
of pre-existing disease on the insurer in cases in which it defends
on the basis of such a clause.26
D. Warranties and Representations
Only two cases on warranty and misrepresentation were published
during 1964. In one, the court of appeals found the evidence that
misstatements were included in insured's application for a group
policy to be so clear and convincing that a verdict should be directed
for the insurer.2 7 In the other, recovery was denied on the grounds
of breach of the occupancy warranty over insured's objection that this
clause was not mentioned in the memorandum of the policy sent to
him.28 The original policy containing the occupancy clause had been
sent to a mortgagee who held a security interest in the insured res.
The memorandum sent to the named insured stated- "This is furnished
simply as a memorandum of said policy as it stands at the date of
issue hereof, and is given as a matter of information only and confers
no rights on the holder and imposes no liability upon this company."
III. MAKING AND MODIFYING T= CONTmar
A. Agent' Errors
In two decisions published during 1964, insurers were held estopped
to defend on the basis of coverage limitations, on the grounds that
the companies failed to respond to notice of changes in the risk when
they should have done so. In Britt v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,2 9 a federal
district court found that the insured had requested (through his wife)
25. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 686 (1957).
26. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Boss, 37 Tenn. App. 456, 264 S.W.2d 587 (M.S. 1953).
27. Minnick v. Federated Life Ins. Co., 378 S.W.2d 189 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
The case also involves a claim of waiver and estoppel on the ground that the insurer's
agent knew the true facts. However, the plaintiffs apparently failed to show that this
particular agent knew of the application for insurance.
28. Provident Washington Ins. Co. v. Reese, 373 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn. 1963).
29. 235 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
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that an endorsement be added to his liability policy indicating' a
change in the status of the insured. The agent apparently failed to
see to it after having assured the insured it would be done. In Shelby
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wilson,30 the company sought to plead that the
property insured under a homeowners policy was not located at the
place indicated in the policy. The court of appeals found adequate
evidence to support the trial jury's apparent conclusion that the
defendant insurer's agent had accepted and the company had retained
premiums on the policy after having learned of the insured's change
of address. While the decisions are not wholly unanimous, there is
considerable authority in other jurisdictions to the effect that such
limitations can be waived,31 and that failure to act may result in
estoppel of the insurer, especially where premiums are retained.
32
B. Effect of Temporary Binder
In National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Carmichael,33 the cestui
que vie's wife applied for a policy on his life. She paid the insurer's
agent two dollars and ninety cents, apparently what they anticipated
would be the first premium, and was given a premium receipt dated
August 19, 1962, which stated:
If said deposit is at least equal to premium for one full month, insurance
under terms of policy applied for shall take effect as of date of said deposit
or date of medical examination (if required), whichever shall be the latter,
provided that on that date Proposed Insured, in the opinion of the Company's
authorized officers in Nashville, Tennessee was insurable and acceptable
under the Company's rules and practices for the Amount, Premium and
Rating Class applied for.
On September 4, 1962, a policy was mailed to the agent, dated Sep-
tember 1, which called for a higher premium because of the cestui
que vie's occupation. The agent received the policy on September 7.
On September 8, before the agent had been able to visit the plaintiff
and collect the additional premium, the cestui que vie was killed.
Although the agent later delivered the policy and collected the
premium, the company denied liability on the ground that the policy
had not come into force at the time of the insured event. Deceased's
wife then brought suit on the policy as beneficiary. The trial court
held that the insurance was already in effect at the time of the hus-
band's death, apparently on the ground of American National Life
Ins. Co. v. Thompsonm a 1957 court of appeals decision, which had
30. 383 S.W.2d 791 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1964).
31. VANCE, INsuRANcE § 140, at 821 (3d ed. Anderson 1951).
32. Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 868, 901-08 (1949).
33. 381 S.W.2d 925 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1964).
34. 44 Tenn. App. 627, 316 S.W.2d 52 (W.D. 1957). The decision adopted much of
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held that a differently worded binding receipt was ambiguous and
capable of being interpreted to create a contract of temporary insur-
ance that would be terminated only by rejection of the application.
In the instant case, the court of appeals reluctantly distinguished
the Thompson decision. In the Thompson opinion it had been noted
that "a counter offer to issue a different policy or to issue the policy
at a different premium rate . . ." would present a separate problem.
The instant court felt that this variation in facts required application
of the usual principle that an acceptance of an application which
adds different terms to it constitutes a rejection of the application
and a counter-offer. Therefore, the trial court was reversed and
recovery denied.35
C. Change of Beneficiary
In Republic National Life Ins. Co. v. Sackmann,36 the Sixth Circuit
upheld a finding of a federal district court that there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding of substantial compliance with the
change of beneficiary provisions of a life policy. The court's statement
of the proper test is: "[W]hether the insured has done everything
that he could do to make the change. The import of this is that he
must convey to the company or its agent a request for the change of
beneficiary. A mere unexecuted intention on the part of the insured
is not enough."
IV. AcTrONS ON ThE CONTRACT
A. Assignability of Liability Insured's Claim
In Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co.,z7 the Tennessee Supreme Court
held that a judgment creditor of the named insured under a liability
policy cannot maintain an action against the insurer for bad faith
and negligence in refusing to settle within policy limits, whether in
his own right or as assignee of the named insured. In reaching the
decision, the court relied heavily on the reasoning of Professor Keeton
in a 1954 article where he stated: "The excess liability of the com-
pany arises out of the relationship between insured and company.
Claimant is a stranger to that relationship." From this premise it
Judge Learned Hand's distinguished opinion in Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947).
35. For a similar result, see New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hinkle, 248 F.2d
879 (8th Cir. 1957), criticized, 33 NoTnE DAmE LANw. 656 (1958). See also Annot.,
2 A.L.R.2d 943 (1948), cited in the instant case.
36. 324 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1963).
37. 381 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. 1964).
38. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HAnv. L. Rv.
1136, 1175-77 (1954).
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would follow that the injured claimant cannot sue the insurer in his
own right for bad faith failure to settle.3 9 The question of assignability
is a bit more difficult. In this jurisdiction, the test of assignability has
been said to be whether the action is survivable. In Came v. Maryland
Cas. Co.,40 it had been held that such causes of action are not survi-
vable, but rather abate on the death of the named insured.4'
B. Contractual Time Limitation
In Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Brown,4 the insurer defended in part on the
ground that insured's action was not filed within twelve months after
the loss. The court of appeals, relying on the Hill case, held that the
twelve month period did not begin to run until the insurer denied
liability.43
C. Penalty Statute
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cherry"4 held that the
penalty statute, section 56-1105 of the Code, does not apply to a
liability insurer, since sums due under this type of contract would
not bear interest until time of entry of judgment. Under the rule of
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
45
the test for application of the penalty statute has been whether interest
would accrue prior to judgment. This rule is derived from the
presence in the statute of these words: "shall be liable to pay the
holder of said policy, in addition to the loss and interest thereon, a
sum not exceeding twenty five per cent .... "
39. Of course, the policy may require a different result, as the article and opinion
both point out.
40. 208 Tenn. 403, 346 S.W.2d 259 (1961).
41. Principal cases contra are from California, where it has recently been held
such a cause of action may be assigned prior to trial of the injury claim. Critz v.
Farmers Ins. Group, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Cal. App. 1964).
42. Supra note 1.
43. On the validity and application of such clauses, see generally 20 APPL--AN,
op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 11601-03.
44. 374 S.W.2d 371 (Tenn. 1964).
45. 156 Tenn. (3 Smith) 517, 3 S.W.2d 163 (1928).
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